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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. (together 
"Maple Grove") appeal from the District Court's dismissal of their lawsuit against the Ada 
County Highway District ("ACHD"). Maple Grove claims business damages from ACHD under 
Idaho Code 9 7-71 l(2) based upon the taking of real property ("Project Property") that ACHD 
needed for its Ustick Road widening project in Boise ("Project"). 
At its heart, this case presents a question of first impression under Idaho law: is an 
established business entitled to bring an action to recover damages caused by a taking of adjacent 
property by a governmental entity? The Idaho Legislature's plainly expressed intent requires an 
affirmative answer. Moreover, this Court has already rejected an effort to place requirements 
upon a qualifying business to recover such damages beyond the elements of the applicable 
statute. Once it is confirmed that an established business may assert its claim, it is a short road to 
the conclusion that Maple Grove satisfies the elements of the statute. On the other hand, even if 
this Court decides that an established business does not have a right to bring such a claim, then 
Maple Grove is still entitled to recover because it has demonstrated a taking of a property interest 
sufficient to support an inverse condemnation action. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. An Established Business Can Bring an Action for Damages under Idaho Code $7-  
711(2). 
Idaho Code 9 7-71 l(2) provides that "any business qualifying under this subsection 
having more than five (5) years' standing" is entitled to compensation for damages "which a 
taking of a portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
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proposed by the [government entity] may reasonably cause." A qualifying business "must be 
owned by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned 
or held by such party." 
In City ofMcCall v. Seubert, this Court upheld a straightforward interpretation of these 
statutory provisions against the city's argument that the businesses needed to prove an interest in 
the property being taken: 
. . . [T]he City's argument that an interest in remaining on the land 
sufficient to claim business damages must be proven by a written 
lease or agreement attempts to import a requirement into the statute 
that does not exist. A business need only meet the statutory 
requirements of I.C. 7-711 in order to make a claim for 
damages resulting from the taking of the underlying property. 
"The right to receive business damages . . . resulting from a taking 
of land is strictly a statutory right . . . ." 29A C.J.S. Eminent 
Domain 5 150 (2004). 
City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,584,130 P.3d 11 18, 1122 (2006) (emphasis added). 
ACHD does not dispute that an established business can assert a claim for business 
damages under I.C. § 7-71 l(2) where an eminent domain proceeding has been initiated by the 
governmental entity or an inverse condemnation action has been filed by the owner of the real 
property. Instead, ACHD's position is that an established business cannot recover damages in 
situations where the governmental entity is able to negotiate the purchase of the property. I 
This Court is familiar with the standards for statutory construction. 
' This is apparently the District Court's view as well. Although the court did not explicitly 
address the implied right of action issue, it consistently treated Maple Grove's claims as inverse 
condemnation claims. See R., p. 104 ("Dr. Klure is required to establish that ACHD has 
engaged in a 'taking' of his interest in the property."). 
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When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give 
force and effect to the legislature's intent in passing the statute. 
Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 
P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal words of 
the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 8 10, 8 13, 13 5 
P.3d 756,759 (2006) (citations omitted). "Where the language of a 
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the 
statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." 
State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). 
However, if the result is "palpably absurd," this Court must engage 
in statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory 
construction, this Court has a "duty to ascertain the legislative 
intent, and give effect to that intent." Id. "[Tlhe Court must 
construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine the intent of the 
legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 336, 870 P.2d at 1295 (internal 
citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all other 
matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations 
and the policy behind the statute." Id. 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,263,207 P.3d 988,994 (2009). 
7-71 1(2) undeniably allows a qualifying business to recover damages caused by a taking. 
ACHD's interpretation of Idaho's eminent domain statute would create a right without a remedy 
in matters in which the government is able to negotiate a purchase of the property. It would 
leave established business owners at the mercy of the condemning entity and the property owner. 
A governmental entity would be encouraged to overpay for the real property in order to cut off 
the right of any qualifying business to make a claim. This proposed interpretation conflicts with 
the intent of the Idaho Legislature, which was to provide compensation to qualifjring business 
owners who are affected by public takings. 
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The ability of an established business to assert its claim for damages under I.C. 5 7- 
71 l(2) is confirmed by Idaho Code 5 7-709. That section provides: 
A11 persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in, 
any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages 
for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead, and 
defend each in respect to his own property or interest, or that 
claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. 
An established business that meets the requirements of I.C. 5 7-711(2) is a person with an 
interest in the damages for the taking of the property and therefore may "appear, plead and 
defend" to the same extent as if they had been named in a complaint for condemnation. 
Maple Grove ;oncedes that the statute does not explicitly provide for the filing of a 
complaint by a qualifying business owner, but it does not provide for the filing of a complaint by 
the property owner, either. This Court has repeatedly recognized a property owner's right to 
initiate an inverse condemnation action. To deny a qualifying business an opportunity to assert 
its claim for damages on the ground that the governmental entity was able to negotiate a 
purchase of the real property inserts requirements into the statute that do not exist, renders 
portions of LC. 3 7-71 l(2) superfluous, and is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature to provide compensation to qualifying businesses. 
There is no requirement in 7-71 l(2) or 7-709 that a qualifying business also possess an 
interest in a portion of the property being condemned, which is precisely the requirement that 
ACHD seeks to impose. Indeed, such a requirement would contradict the plain language of 
those statutes and is exactly the same argument rejected by this Court in Seubert. A business 
may qualify for damages by virtue of being adjacent to the condemned property. A person has 
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standing to appear, plead, or defend by having an interest in the damages arising from the 
taking. If a qualifying business must also be an owner of the property being condemned in order 
to assert such a claim, then those portions of the statutes are unnecessary. 
Finally, there is no logical reason that the Idaho Legislature would have intended to 
condition its grant of a right to damages to a qualifying business upon the inability of the 
government to negotiate a purchase of the property.2 The Idaho Legislature, having provided a 
right to damages for qualifying businesses, must also be presumed to have intended those 
qualifying businesses to be able to assert their claims without being dependent upon an action 
brought by the government or the property owner. The Idaho Supreme Court recognized more 
than ninety years ago that "if the plaintiff can show that the [statutory] duty was imposed for his 
benefit, and that the Legislature had in mind his protection in passing the act in question, and 
intended to give him a vested right in the discharge of that duty, then this will give him such an 
interest as will support an action." State v. American Surety Co. of New York, 26 Idaho 652,671, 
I45 P. 1097, 1102-03 (1914). 
More recently, this Court said, "When a statute is silent regarding private enforcement, 
courts may recognize a private right only when it is necessary to assure effectiveness of the 
statute." Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 926, 908 P.2d 1228, 1233 (1995), 
(citing White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 101,730 P.2d 1014, 1021 (1986)). In both 
Foster and White, this Court concluded that the criminal statutes at issue did not provide for a 
This is particularly true given the fact that the legislature requires a governmental entity to 
negotiate in good faith as a prerequisite to a condemnation action. 
private right of action because civil remedies were available elsewhere. Here, we have precisely 
the situation contemplated by the test described in Foster and White - I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) is silent 
regarding private enforcement by a qualifying business in the absence of an eminent domain 
action, but the ability of a qualifying business to bring an action for compensation is necessary to 
assure the effectiveness of the statute and to implement the intent of the Legislature. 
Florida's eminent domain statute is similar to Idaho's statute in that it provides for an 
award of damages to qualifying businesses and only provides for the commencement of an action 
by the government. Fla.Stat. Section 73.07(3)(b). In State Dept. of Transp. v. Crews, 227 So.2d 
505,506 (F1a.Dist.Ct.A~~. 1969), the court held that a lessee had an independent right to bring a 
claim for business damages despite the fact that the lessee was not a party to the principal action 
for condemnation of the property. 
As this Court recognized in Seubert, an action for business damages resulting from a 
taking of private property for a public use is a statutory ~reation.~ The Idaho Legislature adopted 
a provision that allows an established business to recover damages caused by a taking of adjacent 
property or the property upon which it is located. Regardless of whether the governmental entity 
files an eminent domain action or negotiates a purchase of the needed property, a qualifying 
business must be permitted to bring an action for damages caused by the taking. 
As opposed to a claim for just compensation for a taking of an interest in property, which is 
rooted in the constitution. 
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B. Maple Grove is Entitled to Recover its Business Damages. 
1. Maple Grove is a qualifying business under I.C. 9 7-711(2). 
Having determined that an established business is entitled to bring an action for damages 
under I.C. 5 7-71 1(c), the next question is whether Maple Grove meets the elements of the 
statute. The first requirement is that the business must have been in operation for more than five 
years. It is undisputed that Maple Grove operated in its location at the intersection of Maple 
Grove and Ustick for more than ten years. Therefore, the only question is whether Maple Grove 
was "owned by the party whose lands [were] being condemned or [was] located upon adjoining 
lands owned or held by such party." I . .  7-711(2)(b). ACI-ID does not dispute that Maple 
Grove was owned by the party whose property was purchased by ACHD. The Settlement 
Agreement reflects that the real property purchased by ACHD was owned by Dr. Curtis, who 
was an equal partner with Dr. Klure in Maple Grove. See Seubert, 142 Idaho at 580, 584, 130 
P.3d 11 18, 1122 (company qualified under 7-711(2) where its majority shareholder was the 
owner of the condemned property). In addition, Maple Grove was located upon land owned by 
Dr. Curtis adjacent to the Project Property. Id. (second company qualified under 7-711(2) 
because it was located on remaining property owned by Seubert and was adjacent to the 
condemned portion). 
2. A sale under threat of condemnation is a taking. 
ACHD attempts to avoid its statutory responsibility to compensate Maple Grove by 
claiming that LC. § 7-71 l(c) does not apply because there was no taking of any of Dr. Curtis's 
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property. Instead, ACHD describes its purchase of the property owned by Dr. Curtis as a 
"negotiated, arms-length transaction . . . ." Respondent's Brief, p. 1 9 . ~  Maple Grove's opening 
brief cited several authorities declaring that a sale in lieu of condemnation is equivalent to a 
taking. ACHD's attempts to distinguish these authorities fall flat. 
ACHD acknowledges that, in P.C. Management, Inc. v. Page Two, Inc., 573 N.E.2d 434, 
437 (Ind. App. 1991), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a conveyance in lieu of actual 
condemnation constitutes a condemnation proceeding. ACHD makes much of the fact that the 
court then refused to award damages to a plaintiff whose sublease had expired. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 24. The fact that the sublessee was unable to recover damages was the result of the 
specific terms of the lease at issue in that case. Regardless of the outcome, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals explicitly approved of the principle that a negotiated sale of property was tantamount to 
a taking. 
ACHD next attempts to distinguish Fuddy Duddy's v. State Dept. ofTvansp., 950 P.2d 
773,775 (Nev. 1997), in which the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a purchase made 
under the threat of condemnation is the same as a judicial condemnation. ACHD argues that it 
could not have acquired the office building through eminent domain, but it does not (and indeed 
The District Court found 7-71 1(c) inapplicable for the same reason. "Maple Grove 
Dentistry was a business which was in operation for over ten years so it met the requirement of 
having more than five years standing. Dr. Klure was a half-owner of Maple Grove Dentistry. 
However, the property was not taken by ACHD. It was sold by Dr. Curtis." R, p. 106. Later in 
the same discussion, the court said, "The reason ACHD acquired the Maple Grove Dentistry 
building is because of the voluntary, arms-length sale of it by the property owner, Dr. Curtis." 
Id. at 107. The District Court's analysis is off the mark because it focuses upon the sale of the 
building owned by Dr. Curtis where Maple Grove operated its dental practice rather than the 
strip of land along Ustick that was actually used for the road widening project. 
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cannot) argue that the same was true of the Project Property. ACHD also points out that the 
government in Fuddy Duddy's had passed a condemnation resolution while no such action was 
taken here by ACHD. This argument is disingenuous at best. The undisputed facts in the record 
show that the Project was well underway by the time the Settlement Agreement was reached in 
June 2007. In fact, construction had already begun pursuant to the Right of Way Agreement that 
was executed in November 2006. See R., Exh. 7, (Price Aff., 71 17,20,43). While it may be 
true that ACHD never passed a resolution directing the condemnation of Dr. Curtis's property, 
there is no doubt that a threat of condemnation existed because the Project Property would have 
been condemned if ACHD and Dr. Curtis had not been able to reach an agreement. 
In Lanning v. City of Monterey, 226 Cal.Rptr. 258,262 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), the 
California Court of Appeals found that a sale of property to a city was the essential equivalent of 
its exercise of eminent domain. ACHD notes that the sales agreement in Lanning expressly 
acknowledged that the sale was in lieu of condemnation. Here, the Settlement Agreement says 
exactly the same thing even though it does not use the words "in lieu of condemnation," as can 
be seen in the following excerpts. 
WHEREAS, in connection with the Project, ACE-ID needs to acquire a portion of 
each of the Office Parcel, Parcel 45 and Parcel 44; and 
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B. In exchange for a full and complete release by Curtis, including their 
interest .in Curtis-Klure, and in full and complete settlement of all claims by Curtis, 
arising from or relating in any way to the Project and/or the sale and acquisition by 
ACHD of the properties described in Exhibits A, B and C hereto, including any and all 
claims for damages of any kind or nature whatsoever, and specifically including claims 
for business damages under Idaho Code $ 7-71 1 ,  relocation expenses, and any other 
damage claims, and including claims for attorney fees and costs, ACHD shalI pay the 
following sums: 
R., Exh. 6, (Klure Aff., 7 8). These provisions reflect the fact that the transfer of property from 
Dr. Curtis to ACHD was not a voluntary sale but instead was part of a negotiated resolution of 
Dr. Curtis's claims arising from ACHD's acquisition of the property, including specifically Dr. 
Curtis's share of Curtis-Klure's (Maple Grove's) business damages under 7-711. If the 
transaction was simply a standard purchase of real estate, then why were these provisions 
necessary and why was Dr. Curtis compensated for his share of Maple Grove's business 
damages? 
ACHD attempts to distinguish Vincent v. Redev. Auth., Etc., 487 A.2d 1024, 1025 
(Pa.Commw.Ct. 1985), in which the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a conveyance 
in lieu of condemnation constituted a condemnation proceeding, on the same basis as Fuddy 
Duddy's and Lanning. Nevertheless, the test adopted by the Vincent court was whether the 
events were "part of a proceeding which was directed toward condemnation, and which, indeed, 
would have resulted in the same but for the conveyance of the property by deed." Id This test is 
easily satisfied in the present case. 
To counter the authorities cited by Maple Grove, ACHD cites several cases allegedly 
demonstrating that the acquisition of the Project Property should not be considered a taking. 
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However, none of these cases undercut the principle that a sale under threat of condemnation is a 
taking. 
First and foremost, the bulk of cases cited by ACHD do not involve a sale to a 
government entity. ACHD proves nothing by referencing cases in which negotiations5 01 
 threat^,^ standing alone, were held insufficient to constitute a taking. Maple Grove has never 
argued that such actions resulted in a taking of its property. Rather, a taking occurred because 
ACHD's actions resulted in its acquisition of Dr. Curtis's property, which would never have 
happened at all if not for the road widening project. Absent an actual transfer of property under 
threat of condemnation, the cases cited by ACHD provide no guidance. 
Other cases are inapplicable because the property was not acquired under threat of 
condemnation. ACHD discusses two Texas cases at length, but the alleged threat of 
condemnation in these cases arose after the contract had been executed. Gen. Serv. Comm h v. 
Little-Tex Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex. 2001); State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 
641 (Tex. 2007). There were no sales under threat of condemnation; rather, each plaintiff argued 
that the state committed a taking when it rejected a claim for additional compensation under the 
contract. Id. This fact pattern has no bearing on the present case, where the purchase of the 
Project Parcel was clearly preceded by a threat of condemnation. Texas courts have held that 
such purchases are equivalent to a taking. See, e.g., Schriver v. Tex. Dept. of Transp., 293 
Stahelin v. Forest Preserve Dist. of DuPage County, 877 N.E.2d 121 1 (Ill. 2007); Eckhoffv. 
Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 36 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. 1941); Ferrari v. US.,  73 Fed.Cl. 219 
$2006); B. W. Parkway Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. US. ,  29 Fed.Cl. 669 (1993). 
Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. US. ,  98 F.Supp. 572 (Fed. Ct. C1. 1951); US. v. 
Sponenbarger, 208 U.S. 256 (1939); Danforth v. US. ,  308 U.S. 271 (1939). 
S.W.3d 846,850 (Tex. App. 2009) ("a governmental entity cannot claim immunity from a 
landowner's claim for adequate compensation under [the takings clause] of the Texas 
Constitution, by contracting to purchase the property for a public purpose before initiating 
eminent domain proceedings"); City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 800 (Tex. App. 
2007) (rejecting argument that "because the iplaintiffs] voluntarily entered into an agreement 
with the City, they should not be allowed to now assert that the City has taken or attempted to 
take their property by eminent domain"). 
ACHD also summarizes two California cases, but these are distinguishable because the 
California Court of Appeal expressly found no evidence of any intent to condemn. Instead, both 
cases provided examples of open market transactions that were different from a sale under an 
implied or explicit threat of condemnation. Respondent's Brief at 32-35 (discussing Pacific 
Outdoor Adver. Co. v. City of Burbank, 149 Cal.Rptr. 906 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) and Langer v. 
Redev. Agency, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). These cases are very helpful in 
demonstrating the difference between governmental entities engaging in a commercial 
transaction versus attempting to avoid paying condemnation damages by privately acquiring 
property. 
In the Pacific Outdoor case, the city negotiated a lease of railroad property for the 
purposes of beautification and parking. As a result of the city lease, the railroad terminated 
existing leases with Pacific Outdoor for the placement of billboards. The Pacific Outdoor leases 
were terminable upon 24 hours' notice. Both the trial court and the appeals court found that no 
taking of Pacific Outdoor's interest in the billboard leases had occurred because there was no 
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evidence that the city intended to condemn the property in the absence of the agreement with the 
railroad. The appeals court discussed prior cases in which an intent to condemn was present as 
follows. 
In both Diamond Properties and Concrete Service there is a 
definite and unequivocal manifestation that the public entity in 
question was ready to use its power to condemn, and in fact would 
clearly do so if necessary, to acquire the property at issue. Not only 
has Pacific failed to establish such a "calculated anem~t" by 
Burbank, but all evidence is to the contrary. The personal property 
of Pacific was neither taken nor damaged by the respondent. The 
Railroad terminated the licenses held by the appellant, and it did so 
solely upon the motive of financial and other benefits which it 
foresaw as a result of leasing the said property to Burbank. 
Lacking an intent, or even an indication to condemn, the city was 
dealing in an open market transaction with the Railroad, and we 
are not ready to hold that a public entity is always liable for 
damages in an inverse condemnation suit when it concludes 
transactions in the open market. 
Id. at 910. In the instant case, there is no evidence in the record to support the assertion that Dr. 
Curtis would have sold his property (including the Project Property) if not for the Project. Dr. 
Curtis sold out because his only other choice was to have the Project Property condemned and to 
litigate the issues of just compensation, remainder damages and business damages. 
The Pacific Outdoor court included in a footnote the trial court's discussion of this issue 
at a hearing, which is particularly illuminating. 
"The Court: I think that has to be shown in a case like this. It was 
at least likely there would be a condemnation. In other words, to 
have inverse condemnation, you have to have a taking. A 
transaction that a city has with an outside vendor is not necessarily 
a taking. Cities, like other bodies, municipal and corporate, can do 
business without using their condemnation power. If, for example, 
this property, as I said, it was in the path of a bridge, or a freeway, 
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or something else, which, although there was no resolution, it was 
inferrable from the circumstances that they were going to go 
forward with it anyway, no matter what would have happened, I 
would say your argument would apply, but we don't have that in 
the record." 
Id., m 4.  
Here, we have exactly the situation described by the trial court judge in Paczfic Outdoor - 
regardless of whether a resolution was adopted or an action was filed, the facts are undisputed 
that the Ustick widening project was going forward and would require a strip of Dr. Curtis's 
property adjacent to Maple Grove's building. Under these circumstances, there can only be one 
conclusion - that the acquisition of the property that was utilized for the Project was a taking. 
The analysis in Langer is consistent. In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that they were 
entitled to damages resulting from the termination of their leases pursuant to a development 
agreement between their landlord and a private developer. The developer had a separate 
agreement with the local redevelopment agency to provide hnding for the project. The court 
denied the tenants' claims for compensation because the agency never intended to condemn and 
never acquired the property at issue. The acquisition of the parcels upon which the plaintiffs' 
businesses were located was a matter of contract between the landlord and the developer. 
Applying this case law to the undisputed facts before us, 
we find there was no substantial equivalent of condemnation here. 
Appellants contend the evidence shows that the Agency 
"orchestrated" the termination of the leases, similar to the 
circumstances in Diamond Properties, where the public agency 
privately purchased the property on the condition that the owner 
terminate the tenancies. Diamond Properties is quite different, 
however. In that case it was clear that the public entity intended to 
use its power of condemnation and in fact actually filed a 
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condemnation action, which it later dismissed. The private 
purchase by the entity, conditioned on delivery of the property free 
of tenancies, was therefore clearly in lieu of condemnation. 
Here, on the other hand, the evidence shows that the plans 
for developing the properties were initiated by Cypress and 
Scherer, who sought assistance from the Agency in acquiring other 
properties in the area. The Agency never acquired the Scherer 
properties. Unlike Concrete Service, Diamond Properties and 
Lanning, there was no notice of condemnation nor any threat of 
condemnation of the Scherer properties, nor any evidence that the 
Agency intended to condemn those properties for redevelopment 
of the area. Indeed, in all of the owner participation agreements, 
the Scherer properties were in the group of parcels which were 
already under the control of Cypress and thus did not require 
acquisition by the Agency. 
There is no question here that ACHD intended to acquire the Project Property and 
therefore acquired it under threat of condemnation. In such cases, the California courts routinely 
hold that a taking has occurred. See, e.g., Lanning, 226 Cal.Rptr. at 262; Concrete Service Co. v. 
Dept. of Public Works, Div. of Highways, 78 Ca1.Rptr. 923,926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (where 
agency unequivocally expressed intention to take property for freeway purposes, negotiated sale 
constituted condemnation or its substantial equivalent); Redev. Agency of City of Stockton v. 
Diamond Prop., 76 Cal.Rptr. 269,272 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (agency acted as condemnor where, 
after filing condemnation complaint, it induced property owner to terminate plaintiffs tenancy as 
condition of purchase). 
Only one case cited by ACHD involved a sale under threat of condemnation, and even 
this case is inapplicable. In Knop v. Gardner Edgerton UnifiedSch. Dist. No. 231,205 P.3d 755 
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(Kan. Ct. App. 2009), the plaintiffs sold their property to a school district in order to avoid 
eminent domain proceedings. Less than two years later, the school district chose not to build a 
school and instead sold the property to a developer for a profit of approximately one million 
dollars. A Kansas statute provided, in relevant part: 
I t  within 10 years after entry of final judgment under K.S.A. 
26-511, and amendments thereto, the school district fails to 
construct substantial buildings or improvements that are used for 
school purposes on any real property acquired under this 
subsection, the school district shall notify the original owners or 
their heirs or assigns that they have an option to purchase the 
property from the school district for an amount equal to the 
compensation awarded for the property under the eminent domain 
procedures act. 
K.S.A.2008 Supp. 72-8212a(a) (emphasis added). When the plaintiffs attempted to enforce this 
statutory right, their claim was rejected because there had been no "entry of final judgment" in 
an eminent domain proceeding. The Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledged "the perceived 
inequities presented by the outcome," but it could not circumvent the statutory language. Knop, 
205 P.3d at 766. Although the court distinguished between acquisitions under a threat of 
condemnation and acquisitions via "entry of a final judgment" for the purposes of the specific 
statute at issue, it never held that an acquisition under a threat of condemnation is not a taking 
Consequently, Knop provides no support for ACHD's proposition that a negotiated sale of 
property that would otherwise be the subject of an eminent domain action should not be 
considered the equivalent of a taking for the purpose of applying I.C. 5 7-71 l(2). 
There is ample evidence in the record demonstrating that the Project Property was sold to 
ACHD under threat of condemnation. The first correspondence sent to Dr. Curtis from ACHD 
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explained that "this project will affect your property located within the project boundaries," then 
went on to describe the property acquisition process. R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at 1 35, Exh. H). 
This letter was also accompanied by a document entitled "SUMMARY OF THE RIGHTS OF 
AN OWNER WHEN ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT SEEKS TO ACQUIRE 
PROPERTY THROUGH ITS POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN." Id. 
Later, the Right of Entry Agreement executed by Dr. Curtis and ACHD on November 10, 
2006 unequivocally stated: "In order to complete the Project it will be necessary for ACHD to 
acquire the . . . [plemaneni easement on, over and across the real property as described on 
Exhibit 'B'," which included the Project Property. Id. (Price Aff. at 1 43, Exh. I, Section 1.2). 
The Right of Entry Agreement further provided that it would terminate only upon sale of the 
property, entry of an order of condemnation or the passage of two years, unless a condemnation 
action was pending. Id at Section 3. 
None of Dr. Curtis's property was for sale prior to the Project. Maple Grove intended to 
remain in its original location and would have done so were it not for the Project. R., Exh. 6 
(Klure Aff. at 1 7); Exh. 9 (Klure Second Aff. at 14). 
Finally, ACHD's general counsel testified that "[bly reaching the settlement agreement 
with Dr. Curtis for the purchase of his Property, ACHD accomplished its goal of acquiring 
property by agreement, rather than though condemnation." R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at 1 52). 
3. The fact that Dr. Kiure Relocated his Practice in April 2007 is Immaterial. 
ACHD also contends that Maple Grove is not entitled to assert a claim for business 
damages under 7-71 l(2) because, even if a taking of a portion of Dr. Curtis's property occurred, 
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Dr. Klure had already relocated his practice and any interest that he had in the subject property 
had terminated. This is wrong on the facts, as will be discussed below. It also ignores the 
purpose of the business damages provision in 7-71 1(2), which is to compensate qualifying 
businesses that are displaced by public projects, regardless of the technical legal status on the 
date of the transfer of the property. This Court addressed this issue in Seubert. 
The City argues Intervenors are not entitled to business 
damages under I.C. 3 7-711 because they have no legally 
compensable interest in the underlying property. Because they do 
not own the property and do not have a written lease or agreement 
with Seubert to remain on the land, the City contends Intervenors 
have a mere unilateral expectation to continue to use the property 
or, at-most, a month-to-month lease. 
At the outset, this Court notes that the City's 
characterization of Intervenors as mere lessees with no right to 
remain on the property ignores the factual circumstances of this 
case, i.e., for over a decade, the Seubert family has made 
substantial expenditures of time and money to build and maintain 
the asphalt and concrete plants on the Seubert property in order to 
capitalize on the sub-surface sand and mineral deposits. The City 
offers no evidence that these family-run businesses will not 
continue on the Seubert property for the indefinite future. 
142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 1 122 
Maple Grove stands in the same position as Valley and Cleanvater in Seubert. Maple 
Grove operated at the same location for more than ten years and would have continued to operate 
at that location until its principals retired but for the decision of ACHD to widen Ustick Road. 
The bottom line is that ACHD's acquisition of Dr. Curtis's property that was needed for the 
Ustick Road widening project was the equivalent of a taking for purposes of 7-71 1(2), and Maple 
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Grove, as a qualifying business located on, or adjacent to, the condemned property, is entitled to 
recover the damages that it can prove were caused by the Project. 
C. Maple Grove Had a Property Interest at the Time of the Taking. 
Even if this Court holds that a qualifying business does not have the ability to bring an 
action for damages under 7-71 1(2), and instead must prove the elements of an inverse 
condemnation claim, Maple Grove is still entitled to recover its damages because it had a 
property interest in the land that was effectively condemned by ACHD. 
1. The record indicates that Maple Grove's lease was still in effect on June 22, 
2007. 
ACHD insists that no taking occurred prior to the execution of the Settlement Agreement 
on June 22,2007. Accordingly, ACHD repeatedly states that Dr. Klure did not have any interest 
in the subject property as of June 2007 because he vacated the Office Property in April 2007. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 1 ("Both the lease and the partnership ended in April 2007 when Dr. 
Klure left to practice at another location."), p. 2 ("Klure vacated the premises in April of 2007, 
ending the partnership and his month-to-month holdover tenancy under the expired lease."), pp. 
6-7 (Prior to [June 22,20071, Klure had decided to terminate his partnership with Dr. Curtis and 
relocate his practice."), p. 8 ("Klure had vacated the Dentist Office Property in April of 2007, 
ending his partnership with Dr. Curtis and ending his holdover tenancy of the lease on the 
Dentist Office Property that expired December 3 1,2006."). 
All of these statements are unsupported by the record and are misleading. ACHD 
deliberately refers to Dr. Klure as an individual claimant, despite knowing that both the claim for 
business damages under 7-71 l(2) and the leasehold interest belong to Maple Grove. ACHD's 
allegation that the Maple Grove partnership terminated prior to June 2007 is pure fiction. The 
record shows that Maple Grove's lease terminated effective with the execution of the Settlement 
Agreement, which states that "the Curtis-Klure leases of the Office Parcel and other parcels 
described on Exhibits A, B and C will be terminated prior to closing." R., Exh. 7 (Price Aff. at 
Ex. J, Section H) (emphasis added). 
In fact, the Settlement Agreement indicates that the lease and partnership were still in 
effect: "Dr. Klure, who leases and shares the office space in the Office Parcel as a member of 
Curtis-Klure, has no ownership interest in the Office Parcel or any common areas adjacent 
thereto." Id (emphasis added). The use of the present-tense "leases and shares" establishes the 
existence of an ongoing lease. Furthermore, the Settlement Agreement declares only that Dr. 
Klure had no "ownership interest"; it does not declare that he had no leasehold interest. If Dr. 
Klure, via Maple Grove, had no remaining interest in the property, and the partnership was no 
more, then why was Dr. Klure a party to the Settlement Agreement at all? Why did ACI-ID pay 
Dr. Curtis for his share of Maple Grove's business damages? 
2. The taking began when ACHD invaded the Project Property in November 
2006. 
Idaho law recognizes that a taking is established when a government entity permanently 
invades or interferes with a property interest. In City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,853 
P.2d 596 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993), the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim for inverse 
condemnation, finding that no taking occurred until the city filed an eminent domain action. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals upheld this determination, but its rationale is worthy of examination. 
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First, the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that no compensation was available for takings 
that occur prior to issuance of a summons for an eminent domain action: 
[I]f we were to construe the statute to prohibit compensation for 
takings which occur prior to the date of summons in eminent 
domain proceedings, it would effectively abolish the right to obtain 
the relief sought in inverse condemnation actions. This is because 
"the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the 
proposition that a taking may occur without such formal 
proceedings." 
I d ,  123 Idaho at 857,853 P.2d at 602 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,316,107 S.Ct. 2378,2386 (1987)). The Court of Appeals 
went on to explain that, although it agreed that no taking occurred in that case before the city 
instituted eminent domain proceedings, its determination was "predicated on the court's factual 
finding that the City never interfered with [the plaintiffs] use of her property prior to that date." 
I d ,  123 Idaho at 858,853 P.2d at 603. 
Several other jurisdictions have likewise held that a taking occurs when a govemment 
entity permanently invades or interferes with a property interest. See, e.g., Clay County Realty 
Co. v. City of Gladstone, 254 S.W.3d 859,864 (Mo. 2008) (landowner need not show physical 
taking where an invasion or appropriation of property right can be shown); Rose v. City oj 
Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d 522 (Neb. 1989) (taking occurs when govemment entity exercises 
dominion over or appropriates an interest in private property); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. 
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 924,540 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Wash. 1975) (invasion of private 
lands causing permanent or recurring damage constitutes unconstitutional taking); Klopping v. 
City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Cal. 1972) (de facto taking occurs upon physical invasion 
or direct legal restraint); City ofBuffa20 v. J: W Clement Co., 253,269 N.E.2d 895,902 (N.Y. 
1972) (direct invasion of property or direct legal restraint on its use constitutes de facto taking). 
In this case, ACHD concedes that it invaded the Project Property long before Dr. Klure 
moved his practice. Respondent's Brief at 16 ("[Dr.] Klure and Dr. Curtis continued their 
practices for some months during construction of the Project and while ACHD physically 
occupied the strip of land needed for the Project"). This invasion or interference was pennanent; 
ACHD occupied the Project Property until it acquired title thereto. Thus, the appropriate date of 
taking for the Project Property is approximately November 2006, well before Maple Grove's 
leasehold interest was te~minated.~ 
3. Maple Grove had an interest in the Project Property. 
Because Maple Grove was located upon lands adjoining the Project Property, it is not 
required to prove a taking of its property interest in order to establish a right to business 
damages. LC. 3 7-71 l(2). Nevertheless, Maple Grove had the right to use the Project Property 
for ingress, egress and parking, and it received no compensation from ACHD when this right 
was taken for a public use. See R., Exh. 8 at 7 3  (providing that Lots 17 through 20 have a 
ACHD also refers repeatedly to the fact that the Maple Grove lease was not renewed and 
therefore converted to a month-to-month lease as of December 31,2006. This is hardly 
surprising or significant. The Ustick widening project commenced in 2005. R., Exh. 7 (Price 
Aff., 7 17.) By early 2006, it was clear that ACHD needed to acquire some of Dr. Curtis's 
property for the project. Id., 77 34-36. ACHD entered the Project Property and started 
construction in November 2006. There was no reason to renew the lease at the end of 2006 
because, by that time, both Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure knew that they would have to move their 
practices. 
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nonexclusive easement over Lot 16 for various uses, including ingress, egress and parking). This 
is also reflected in the Settlement Agreement executed by ACHD. 
WHEREAS, Curtis-Klure, PLLC dba Maple Grove Dentistry ("Curtis-Klure") is 
equally owned by Dr. Curtis and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. ("Dr. Klure") and has leased the 
Office Parcel with concurrent rights in Parcels 44 and 45 from Curtis Tor operation of its 
dental practice since 1997; and 
R., Exh. 6 (Klure Aff., Exh. 2). 
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dept. of Transp., 839 So.2d 727, 730 (Fla.App.2 Dist., 2003), 
confirms that a taking occurs when a leasehold interest in common areas is taken without 
compensation. ACHD attempts to distinguish Winn-Dixie from the present case, but its 
arguments are without merit. ACHD first points out that Winn-Dixie involved a condemnation 
action, but, as discussed above, a sale in lieu of condemnation is equivalent to a condemnation 
action. ACHD claims that Maple Grove lacked a property interest at the time of the taking, but 
this is also &ong. Finally, ACHD notes that the lease in Winn-Dixie expressly addressed 
parking, including a separate fee for maintenance. Although Maple Grove's lease did not 
address parking, common sense dictates that parking was one of the benefits bargained for by 
Maple Grove. The building would have no value as a professional office unless there was an 
appurtenant right to access and parking in the common areas, which included the Project 
Property. The Settlement Agreement explicitly refers to these "concurrent rights." Given these 
facts, it seems reasonable to conclude that some portion of Maple Grove's $6835 monthly rent 
was attributable to parking and access on the Project Property. 
D. Maple Grove Is Entitled to Recover Relocation Costs. 
ACHD claims that Maple Grove cannot recover relocation costs because it did not follow 
the procedures outlined in the Idaho Highway Relocation Assistance Act, Idaho Code § 40-2001 
et seq. However, 7-71 l(2) provides a separate basis for recovering relocation costs, as 
recognized by this Court in Seubert: "The language in I.C. 5 7-71 1 (2)(b) . . . does not preclude 
an award of relocation costs." 123 Idaho at 585, 130 P.3d at 1123. Consequently, Maple 
Grove's compliance with the Idaho Highway Relocation Assistance Act is immaterial. 
E. Maple Grove's Losses Were Not Prevented by Relocation. 
ACHD dips into the City of McCall's playbook one last time and asserts that Maple 
Grove is not entitled to business damages because it relocated its business. In support of this 
proposition, ACHD cites 7-71 1(2), which provides in part: "Business damages under this 
subsection shall not be awarded if the loss can reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the 
business . . . or for damages caused by temporary business interruption due to construction." 
This argument fails for several reasons. First, a significant portion of Maple Grove's 
business damages are losses incurred in the relocation process. These losses were caused by 
relocation, not mitigated by it. 
Second, 7-71 l(2) does not preclude recovery of all losses suffered by a relocating 
business, only those losses that could reasonably have been prevented by relocation. As this 
Court explained in Seubert, the statutory language "merely serves to prevent a business from 
sitting on the condemned property and claiming business damages that could have been 
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mitigated by relocating." 123 Idaho at 585, 130 P.3d at 1123. There is no allegation anywhere 
in the record that Maple Grove engaged in such conduct; rather, ACI3D is attempting to avoid 
paying business damages by arguing that Maple Grove relocated too soon. 
Finally, the record reflects that Maple Grove is not merely seeking damages caused by 
temporary business interruption. In his second affidavit, Dr. Klure clearly stated his concerns 
about the completed project. R., Exh. 9 (Klure Second Aff., 11 2,3). There is no evidence in the 
record to support ACHD's contention that the Project did not interfere with Maple Grove's 
dental practice.8 While the nature and extent of the damage caused to Maple Grove by the 
Project is an issue that has not yet been addressed, the facts of this case demonstrate that some 
damage occurred. Otherwise, why would both Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure decide that Maple Grove 
could no longer operate in the setting left by the Project? And, again, why did ACHD 
compensate Dr. Curtis for his share of Maple Grove's business damages? 
F. Maple Grove Is Entitled to Recover Its Attorney Fees on Appeal if It Prevails in the 
Action. 
A condemnee is entitled to recover its attorney fees if the condemnor does not reasonably 
make a timely offer of settlement of at least ninety percent of the ultimate jury verdict. Ada 
County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 877, 673 P.2d 1067, 1071 (1983). This 
also applies to qualifying businesses that are entitled to damages under 7-71 l(2). Seubert, 123 
Idaho at 587, 130 P.3d at 1125. 
ACHD cites to portions of Steve Price's Affidavit for support of this. Mr. Price's Affidavit is 
devoid of any facts that would indicate expertise on the subject of dental practices. His 
statements on the issue are not admissible evidence. 
ACHD attempts to distance itself from these holdings by pointing out that the existence 
of a taking is "a threshold issue that must be established before an inverse condemnation action 
can be maintained." KMST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577,582,67 P.3d 56,61 (2003); 
Covington v. J e f f s o n  County, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828,831 (2002). However, in these 
cases, this Court was merely addressing the elements of an inverse condemnation claim, not a 
governmental entity's liability for attomey fees. 
ACHD's primary concern appears to be that Acarrequi forces it to make a judgment call 
as to whether a settlement is warranted, without the benefit of first receiving a judicial 
determination. This hardly places ACHD in a unique situation. The law routinely expects 
individuals and entities to determine whether a given course of action will create liability for 
attomey fees. Acarrequi creates a strong incentive for government entities to carefully consider 
the merits of a claim, rather than delegating that burden to the judicial system. 
Therefore, upon remand, if Maple Grove prevails in this action and recovers business 
damages against ACHD, then it will be entitled to its fees and costs, including those incurred this 
appeal, pursuant to Idaho Code 3 7-718 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l)(B). 
111. CONCLUSION 
Idaho's eminent domain statute contains the clearly expressed intent of the Idaho 
Legislature to compensate established businesses that are damaged by the taking of real property 
for public use. The undisputed facts in the record show that ACHD needed to acquire property at 
the intersection of Ustick and Maple Grove for the Ustick widening project, including property 
owned by Dr. Curtis and subject to the lease between Dr. Curtis and Maple Grove. By acquiring 
the property for use in the project, ACHD triggered the application of Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) and 
must compensate any qualifying business for the damages reasonably caused by the taking. 
Maple Grove is a qualifying business by virtue of being located upon adjoining property owned 
by Dr. Curtis. In addition, ACHD infringed upon Maple Grove's leasehold interest when it 
acquired property for the Project. Maple Grove should he permitted to proceed with proof of the 
damages reasonably caused by the Project. 
For these reasons, Maple Grove respectfully requests that this Court reverse the judgment 
of the trial court and remand this action with the instruction that partial summary judgment be 
entered in Maple Grove's favor on the issue of Maple Grove's right to recover any business 
damages that it can prove were reasonably caused by the Project. 
--A 
DATED This A day of March, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP /- 
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